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ABSTRACT In response to the 2011 Tunisian elections and the uncertainty surrounding
Tunisia’s future, we oﬀer an empirical explanation of the election’s results using socioeco-
nomic and demographic variables. We aggregate many political analyses to describe the
main parties and give insights into their strengths and weaknesses.We also examine com-
mon misconceptions advanced during the elections. Finally, we include a proposed elec-
toral map that could be used by politicians to plan their future political strategies.
Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor,set himself aﬂame on December 17, 2010, andtriggered an uprising that brought the 23-yearrule (1987–2011) of Zine El Abidine Ben Alito an end.This uprising sparked similar upris-
ings in otherArab countries inwhat has become commonly known
as the “Arab Spring.” On October 23, 2011, Tunisia became the
ﬁrst test of democracy for the Arab Spring by holding free and
fair elections to electmembers of itsNational Constituent Assem-
bly (NCA) (Zelin 2011).
In this article, we introduce the key political parties in Tunisia
that participated in the election.We attempt to debunk the main
misconceptions about the election.We also provide an empirical
explanation of the elections’ outcome in Tunisia based on socio-
economic and demographic factors and propose an electoral map
that could be used by political parties in future elections.
THEMAIN POLITICAL PARTIES IN TUNISIA
More than 100 political parties participated in the 2011 Tunisian
elections. However, the major parties presented in this section
enjoyed 72.1% of the popular vote and won 90.8% of the seats at
the NCA (see Figure 1).
Ennahda was founded in 1981 as the Movement of the Islamic
Tendency (Teyeb 2011) and was originally inspired by the Egyp-
tianMuslim Brotherhood (Lewis 2011). Ennahda had a history of
violence, but starting in the 1980s it began to promote itself as
amoderate Islamist political party. It also served as themain oppo-
sition party to then-President Ben Ali (Wright 2001) until the
latter eradicated Ennahda in the 1990s by jailing and exilingmany
of its activists. The party is currently led by its cofounder Rachid
Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi is a renowned scholar in Islamic think-
ing, and he has spent 20 years in exile before returning shortly
after the revolution.
Ennahdawas the bigwinner of the 2011 electionswith 37.5% of
the vote and 41% of the seats in theNCA. It has nationwide appeal
across all governorates with a milder dominance in coastal gov-
ernorates. A common theory is that Ennahda was successful at
convincing voters that it is the best party for defending aMuslim
and Arabic identity rather than a Europeanized identity (Alexan-
der 2010). Ennahda also courted moderate voters by signaling its
intent to preserve many of the modern and secular achievements
that Tunisia had achieved, especially the Law of Personal Status,
which signiﬁcantly expanded women’s rights. Consequently,
Ennahdawas labeled as amoderate Islamic party (Heneghan 2011).
The Congress for the Republic (CPR) was founded in 2001 by
MoncefMarzouki (current InterimPresident ofTunisia). In 2002,
then-President BenAli banned theCPR and forcedMarzouki into
exile in Paris (Farid 2011).
TheCPR,which is a center-left secular political party, has estab-
lished itself as the second leading political force inTunisia thanks
to its nationwide appeal. The party managed to gain seats across
all governorates in the 2011 elections (Belkaid 2011). The CPR
beneﬁted frompursuing a centristmessage and avoiding confron-
tation with Ennahda.
Ettakatol (The Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties) is a
secular center-leftist party that was founded in 1994 byMustapha
BenJafar (currentSpeakerof theNCA)andbecameoﬃcial in2002.1
The appeal of Ettakatol is concentrated in thenorth of the country
and the governorate of Sfax. Like CPR, Ettakatol pursued a cen-
tristmessageandavoidedconfrontationwithEnnahda.This strat-
egy allowed both CPR and Ettakatol to perform better than other
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secularparties(Alexander2010).However, strongcompetitionfrom
Ennahda,CPR,andtheAlAridhaparty; the lackofa resonantmes-
sage; andan ill-prepared structure in the interior governorates and
the south of the country have limited Ettakatol’s success.
AlAridha (ThePopularPetition forFreedom, Justice andDevel-
opment) was formed after the revolution in March 2011. It was
founded by Mohamed Hechmi Hamdi, owner of Al-Mustakillah
Satellite TV (Ajmi 2011).
Al Aridha’s popularity was the biggest surprise of the Tuni-
sian election. Its popularity is higher in the interior governorates
where the revolution actually started (Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Kai-
rouan). Unlike other parties, Al Aridha focused primarily on eco-
nomic and social reforms without addressing personal liberties,
democracy, and the constitution. Questionable methods, such as
the use of theAl-Mustakillah2 televisionnetwork and support from
oﬃcials previously aﬃliated with Ben Ali’s Constitutional Dem-
ocratic Rally (known by its French initials RCD),may have helped
Al Aridha spread its message.
Progressive andLiberal Parties include thePoleDemocratePro-
gessist (PDP), Afek Tounes, the Democratic Modernist Pole
(PDM), the Moubadara Party, and the Tunisian Workers’ Com-
munist Party (PCOT).
The PDP was cofounded by Ahmed Nejib Chebbi (attorney
and politician) and Maya Jribi (politician and active member in
the Tunisian League of Human Rights) in 1983 as the Progressive
Socialist Rally party and became oﬃcial in 1988. Its name was
changed to PDP in 2001 (Chrisaﬁs 2011). The party is the most
leftist secular party inTunisia and is considered the ﬁercest oppo-
nent to Ennahda.
The PDP fell short of expectations because it did not achieve a
position among the top three as many analysts had predicted
(Coleman 2011; McCurdy 2011). Its weak performance in the cap-
ital city of Tunis was unexpected given the party’s considerable
media exposure and marketing eﬀorts3 (Keﬁ 2011). This failure is
the result of the PDP’s electoral message that carried an extreme
anti-Ennahdaposition.Therefore,manymoderate voters expressed
antipathy toward PDP’s polarized politics (McCurdy 2011).
AfekTounes is a center-right liberal party focusing on secular-
ism and civil liberties founded after the revolution inMarch 2011.
It mainly attracted intellectuals and the upper class (Chrisaﬁs
2011).
PDM is a centrist-socialist coalition created to gain seats in
the NCA. The party focuses on the separation between religion
and politics and emphasizes the importance of gender equality.
Together, Afek Tounes and PDM fared well mostly in coastal cit-
ies and around the capital.
TheMoubadaraParty, founded byKamelMorjane (former For-
eignMinister under BenAli regime), had a strong performance in
the governorates ofMonastir andSousse because of the solid infra-
structure of the RCD Party in those governorates (Sayah 2013).
The PCOT is a secular extreme left (Marxist-Leninist) politi-
cal party formed in 1986. Despite being targeted by repressive
practices of the Ben Ali regime (such as torture and jailing of its
protesters), the PCOT was well known in Tunisia (Sta Ali 2011).
Several famous leaders and political ﬁgures are part of its history
including HammaHammami, a political activist noted for strong
opposition to the government of Ben Ali, and the human rights
lawyer Radhia Nasraoui. Its poor performance ( less than 2% of
the votes) can be explained by the global decline of communism
and the party’s lack of ﬁnancial resources.
DATA ANDMETHODOLOGY
We collected our data from diﬀerent sources, namely the Superior
Independent Authority for the Elections-Tunisia (ISIE) (www
.isie.tn), National Institute of Statistics-Tunisia (www.ins.nat.tn),
Ministry of Industry and Trade-Tunisia (www.tunisieindus-
trie.nat.tn) andWorld Food Program (www.wfp.org). The data rep-
resent each of the 24 governorates and 27 electoral districts in
Tunisia.4 The data include total votes and seats by party, macro-
economic variables for diﬀerent sectors (e.g., education, transpor-
tation, tourism, telecommunication, and health) and some
demographic variables (e.g., marital status, dwelling, and age
range). The data representing macroeconomic and demographic
variables were collected in 2007 and 2010. To avoid discrepancies
Figure 1
Vote and Seat Distribution
~Color online.!
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in the data, we normalized some variables with respect to the
number of inhabitants (e.g., number of hotels andnumber of librar-
ies) and others with respect to the area by governorate (e.g.,
national roads and cultivated areas).
We note several limitations to this study, including the small
samplesize, thelackofexitpolls,andthelimitedavailabilityofsocio-
economic and demographic data. Another limitation is the diﬃ-
cultyofanalyzingthevoteof theTunisiandiasporanamely inNorth
America, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, and theMiddle East.
COMMONMISCONCEPTIONS ABOUTTHE
TUNISIAN ELECTIONS
In this section, we analyze some commonmisconceptions regard-
ing theTunisian elections.Thesemisconceptions were widely cir-
culated by political analysts, journalists, and Tunisian people.
Misconception 1: Voters are more likely to vote for men.
Despite eﬀorts to promote the participation of female candidates
in the election and the enactment of the alternation principle
imposed by the ISIE, the percentage of women who head elec-
toral lists remained low at 7%.5 This alternation principle stated
that in the electoral lists across all regions, male and female can-
didatesmust alternate, so that every electoral list is equally divided
between men and women. Knowing that conservatism still pre-
vails inmany governorates, onemay assume that votersmay favor
male candidates.
As shown in table 1, we do not see any discernible diﬀerence
between the votes for electoral lists headed by women as com-
pared with those headed by men, suggesting there is no negative
bias against women candidates. We may then infer that voters
make their selection based on parties rather than on candidates.
However, the balanced distribution of the head on the electoral
lists was actually uneven because coastal governorates (suppos-
edlymore liberal) had ahigher percentage of candidate lists headed
by women (17% for coastal governorates vs. 9% for interior gover-
norates). In addition, the more conservative parties strategically
picked the woman who would head their lists. For instance, the
only woman to head the electoral list for Ennahda was Souad
Abderrahim, who was a candidate in Tunis II, the most liberal
governorate. She was also the only Ennahda candidate who does
not wear a headscarf. This par-
tially weakens our argument
about the role of gender with
respect to voting for Ennahda
or CPR, as gender bias could
have been tactically built into
the election results when pre-
paring the candidates’ list.
However, our argument holds
for some parties (Ettakatol,
PDM, Afek, and PDP). In the
end, women won 49 out of 217
seats, with 42 of those 49 seats
belonging to Ennahda.
Misconception 2: Too many
parties confused the voters.
Next we examine whether the
multiplicity of parties caused
vote dilution. The data show that the highest percentages of
wasted votes occurred in governorates that had fewer parties run-
ning in the elections (mostly in the south and interior). In fact, a
negative correlation (0.32; p-value 0.002) exists between the
number of electoral lists and the percentage of wasted votes. A
striking case is that the electoral districts of Tunis I and Tunis II
(two electoral districts of the capital city of Tunis), each with
nearly 80 parties running in the elections (see ﬁgure 2), had the
lowest percentages of wasted votes (23%). This result may be
because of the intense media focus on voting for parties with
bigger chance of winning a seat at the NCA, a better understand-
ing of electoral rules, and stronger name recognition of leading
parties in the coastal governorates.
Misconception 3: Liberal parties lost the most because of the
plurality of the votes.
A common misconception is that progressive parties would have
done better if there had been less vote dilution. By comparing the
pie charts of seats assigned to each party and the votes’ distribu-
tion (see ﬁgure 1), we see that CPR, Ettakatol, PDP, and Al Aridha
gained substantially higher percentages of seats compared to their
share of the votes. For instance, CPR and Ettakatol received 8.5%
and 6.8% of the vote, respectively, while being awarded 13.4% and
9.2% of the seats at the NCA. The PDP was awarded 7.4% of the
seats at the NCA, which is more than twice its share (3.5%) of the
votes (see ﬁgure 1). The biggest losers were smaller parties and
independent lists.
Misconception 4: It pays to focus on winning in Tunis.
A primary cause of the 2011 revolution was widespread discon-
tent about economic conditions in governorates largely ignored
by the Ben Ali regime. Prior to the 2011 uprising, similar protests
took place in southern and internal governorates such as Redeyef
2009 and Gafsa 2008 (Hopmann and Zartman 2012). Hence, the
ISIE proposed an electoral system that provides a greater voice to
these neglected governorates (see ﬁgure 3). Under this system,
gaining a seat in the NCA requires nearly twice as many votes in
the major cities (e.g., Tunis and Sousse) as it does in the internal
governorates (e.g., Tatouine and Tozeur). This situation led some
leading parties to compete in crowded coastal governorates even
though winning votes in interior governorates would have
Table 1
Test of Diﬀerence of Average Votes for Male versus Female
Candidates by Party
MALE CANDIDATE FEMALE CANDIDATE
Observations Average % Vote Observations Average % Vote P-VALUE T-STAT
Ennahda 26 37.7 1 30.8 NA NA
Moubadara 15 3.88 3 1.72 .24 .59
PDM 17 2.07 10 2.09 .98 −.02
PDP 23 3.63 4 4.01 .63 −.48
POCT 16 1.46 3 1.45 .98 .02
Ettakatol 25 5.75 2 5.8 .98 −.01
Afek 14 1.63 5 3.84 .0049 −3.23
CPR 27 — — NA NA
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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provided a higher payoﬀ in terms of gaining seats in the NCA.
For instance, the electoral district ofTunis II was overloaded with
high-proﬁle candidates (e.g., Ahmed Nejib Chebbi (PDP) and
Ahmed Brahim (PDM)), resulting in many of them not being
elected or barely winning seats in the NCA.
Misconception 5: It pays to form electoral coalitions.
In February 2012, three opposition parties (Afek, PDP, andRepub-
lican Party) announced plans to merge into a single leftist party,6
and this news was cheered by modernists as this merger creates
force. But is this merger better than acting independently?
We analyzed whether main
partieswouldbeneﬁt ifprogres-
sive parties (PDP, PDM, and
Afek) merged and formed a
coalition.Wesimulatedtheelec-
tion results assuming that the
coalition was formed prior to
the election. The results are a
direct implication of the ISIE
seatassignments.Overall, there
would have been a net gain of
only two seats for the coalition.
However, most gains would
have been realized in interior
governorates (e.g., Gabes, Kai-
rouan, Kebili, Kef, and Tozeur)
where progressive parties did
not dowell.The coalition strat-
egywould not have been favor-
able, however, in governorates
where progressive parties per-
formed better (Tunis I, Nabeul
I, Ben Arous, and Ariana). In
fact, Ennahdawouldhaveprof-
ited asmuch as the progressive
coalition by gaining two addi-
tional seats.Theonlymeaning-
fulbeneﬁtwouldhavebeenthat
the resulting coalition would
becomethesecondlargestpolit-
icalparty inTunisiaaheadofthe
CPR (see table 2).
SOCIOECONOMIC AND
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS
Next, we attempted to uncover
the socioeconomic and demo-
graphic determinants that
inﬂuenced each party’s votes.
There are many approaches to
this as suggested by Al-Tayeb
(2012): (1) a sociological model
measuring the impact of socio-
economic drivers on voters’
choice, (2) a psychopolitical
model proposing that voters
choose candidates out of an
emotionalandsentimentalrela-
tionship, and (3) an economic
model assuming that voters are rational in drawing their political
choices given degrees of beneﬁts.We followed the ﬁrst approach
andused regressionmodelswhere the share of votes for eachparty
is the dependent variable and various socioeconomic and demo-
graphic factors are the independent variables (see table 3).
Factors Aﬀecting Ennahda Vote
This model has an R-squared of 80.9%. The following variables
had a negative impact on the share of votes Ennahda received: the
percentage of agricultural land, the number of hotels, and the per-
centage of families receiving public assistance. The number of
Figure 2
Percent VotesWasted versus Number of Electoral Lists by
Governorate
~Color online.!
Figure 3
Number of Voters Required per Seat
~Color online.!
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pharmacies and the total kilometers of national roads positively
inﬂuenced the votes. The result shows that not only poor, rural
governorates voted for Ennahda, but urban governorates did as
well. The negative impact of agricultural land is probably because
of Ennahda’s presence in the semidesert of south Tunisia.
Factors Aﬀecting Ettakatol Vote
Themodel explains 90% of Ettakatol’s votes and shows that higher
demographic density—and older and wealthier population (using
number of cars as a proxy)—and proximity to the capital had a
positive eﬀect on Ettakatol’s share of the vote. These results are
consistent with the characteristics of Ettakatol’s supporters.
Factors Aﬀecting CPR Vote
Thismodel has an R-squared of 61.4% and highlights the strength
of an economic rationale.The governorates that voted forCPRare
characterized by higher education at a lower age, higher industrial
level, andhigher level of availability of freehealth care for families.
However, thenumberof librariesandthelevelofaccesstosafedrink-
ing water had a negative impact on CPR’s share of the vote.
Factors Aﬀecting Al Aridha Vote
This model explains 55.3% of the Al Aridha vote. The agricultural
level of the governorate, the household size, the lower level of
education for young adults (aged 19–24), and the unemployment
Table 2
Impact of Progressive Coalition on Seats’
Allocation
GOVERNORATES
TOTAL
SEATS
NET CHANGE
FOR COALITION
NET CHANGE FOR
OTHER PARTIES
Gabes 7 + 1 seat Al Aridha −1
Kairouan 9 + 1 seat Ettakatol −1
Kebili 5 + 1 seat Al Aridha −1
Kef 6 + 1 seat Ettakatol −1
Manouba 7 + 1 seat Al Aridha −1
Monastir 9 + 1 seat Al Aridha −1
Sfax II 9 + 1 seat POCT −1
Tozeur 4 + 1 seat CPR −1
Ariana 8 − 1 seat Al Aridha +1
Ben Arous 10 −1 seat Ennahda +1
Medenine 9 −1 seat Independents +1
Nabeul I 7 −1 seat Ennahda +1
Sidi Bouzid 8 −1 seat Independents +1
Tunis I 9 −1 seat Al Aridha +1
Table 3
Key Inﬂuences of Main Parties’ Vote
ENNAHDA ETTAKATOL CPR AL ARIDHA PROGRESSIVE
R2 0.809 0.90 0.614 0.553 0.515
R2 adjusted 0.756 0.879 0.507 0.459 0.413
Sig. F. 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.006
Impact
Power
Impact
Direction
Impact
Power
Impact
Direction
Impact
Power
Impact
Direction
Impact
Power
Impact
Direction
Impact
Power
Impact
Direction
Agricultural land 1 − 1 +
Pharmacies 2 +
Hotels 4 − 4 +
National roads 3 +
Health-care access 5 −
Demographic density 1 +
Distance to capital 3 − 3 −
Number of cars 4 +
Age 40 and above 2 +
Access to drinking water 4 −
Education age 6 to 14 1 + 1 +
Libraries 2 −
Industrial zones* 5 +
Free health care 3 +
Education age 19 to 24 4 −
Unemployment age 30 to 34 3 +
Household size 2 +
Age 15 to 40 2 −
*The Industrial Land Agency established the number of industrial zones.
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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rate of those aged 30–34 had a positive impact on
AlAridha’s share of the vote. In otherwords, pov-
erty, illiteracy, and economic factors explain the
surprisingly high share of vote for Al Aridha.
Factors Aﬀecting Progressive Vote
The model explains 51.5% of progressive parties’
votes (Afek, PDP, and PDM). These parties’ key
voters are educated, wealthy, and older. Another
key inﬂuence is the distance to the capital as these
parties are much more popular in Tunis.
THETUNISIAN ELECTORALMAP
Finally, we present a strategic electoral map of
Tunisia that could be used in the next elections
(see ﬁgure 4). We explore which governorates
have similar characteristics and could be grouped
together as a voting block that would vote for
the same parties.We used the k-mean clustering
analysis and included the votes’ share by party
as input data. We ﬁnd that governorates are
grouped along ﬁve main clusters (see table 4):
Cluster 1 Represents “the Ennahda
Stronghold”
Cluster 1 is comprised of the governorates of
Gabes,Kairouan,Medenine,andTatouine,where
Ennahdahadthestrongestshowing.TheEnnahda
votealsohasastrongidentityconnotationasthese
governorates have always been characterized by
deeper conservative Islamic values and Arab
nationalism.Moreover,manyEnnahdakeypolit-
ical ﬁgures are native to the south.
Cluster 2 Represents “the Al Aridha Fortress”
Cluster 2 is solely comprised of SidiBouzid,where
the revolution began. Sidi Bouzid has the lowest
literacy and demographic growth rates in Tuni-
sia and a high unemployment rate.
Cluster 3 Represents “the Dostourian Vote”
Cluster 3 consists of the governorates of Monas-
tir and Sousse and is characterized by a strong
showing of the Dostourian parties (mainly El
Moubadara).7
Cluster 4 Captures “the Progressive-Liberal
Vote”
Cluster 4 consists of the coastal governorates ofAriana, BenArous,
Bizerte, Manouba, Nabeul, Sfax, andTunis, as well as the interior
governorate of Kebili.The presence ofKebili in this cluster is prob-
ably because of the strong performance of CPR in this governor-
ate (27% of the vote). The centrist and liberal parties (Afek, PDP,
Ettakatol, and PDM) had their best showing here as well. These
governorates have ahigher urbandensity anddemographic growth
rate, lower unemployment and illiteracy rates, better indicators
of wealth (e.g., cars per inhabitants, doctors per inhabitants), and
higher levels of education.
Cluster 5 Embodies “the Economic Vote”
Cluster 5 consists of the northwestern governorates (Beja, Kef,
Siliana, and Jendouba) and the interior southwestern governor-
ates (Tozeur, Kasserine, and Gafsa), as well as Mahdia and Zag-
houan. These governorates, mostly geographically contiguous,
are characterized by slower economic growth, low demographic
density, high rates of migration, and the highest unemployment
rates. Voters in these governorates seem mostly concerned about
poor economic conditions and are not driven by ideological
preferences.
CONCLUSION
This studyprovidesanempirical analysisof the2011Tunisianelec-
tions and oﬀers insights on misconceptions that have circulated
sincetheelections.Theregressionanalysis identiﬁespotential inﬂu-
ences of the vote. Political parties could use this information to
enhance future campaign strategies. Finally, ourﬁndingsoﬀerﬁve
voting clusters that represent a newTunisian electoral map. This
Figure 4
The Tunisian Electoral Map
Prepared by Sana Karray Hababou
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mapcan serve as an important tool forpolitical parties inplanning
their campaign strategies for the next elections.
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NOTES
1. www.ettakatol.org.
2. According to the electoral code, political parties were forbidden from using
foreign TV channels to carry out their political message. Given that Al-
Mustakillah (www.almustakillah.com) is based in London, UK, it should have
not been allowed to promote Al Aridha.
3. Although no exact estimates on total spending by party are available, it is
widely documented that the PDP and Union Patriotique Libre (UPL) parties
spent the most during the elections.
4. There are more speciﬁcally 24 governorates and 27 electoral districts because
three governorates (Nabeul, Tunis, and Sfax) have each 2 sub-governorates
(e.g., Tunis I and Tunis II). However, for the purpose of our statistical analysis
we aggregate the votes for sub-governorates and consider only the governor-
ates because socioeconomic and demographic variables are available only for
the 24 governorates and not for sub-governorates.
5. For more details, see ISIE website:
www.isie.tn.
6. http://www.tap.info.tn.
7. These two regions mark the birth
place of the Dostourian movement,
which was at the forefront for
Tunisia’s ﬁght for independence
from French colonialism and in-
cluded historic leaders such as
Habib Bourguiba, Farhat Hached,
and Bahi Ladgham.
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NUMBER OF GOVERNORATES 4 1 2 9 8
Ennahda (% vote) 50.77 15.58 34.15 32.83 40.08
Ettakatol (% vote) 1.91 1.05 4.02 4.03 9.10
CPR (% vote) 6.94 1.69 4.85 6.00 12.35
PDP (% vote) 3.22 1.18 2.68 4.71 3.63
Moubadara (% vote) 0.21 1.22 19.78 1.14 0.96
PDM (% vote) 1.25 0.89 1.98 2.11 2.43
Al Aridha (% vote) 8.38 38.20 4.18 7.90 4.25
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% Population age 40 plus 26.70 25.90 26.95 29.21 29.86
% Married 50.38 49.00 52.55 51.07 52.14
Average household size 5.05 5.15 4.44 4.73 4.45
% Illiterate (age 10 plus) 20.53 28.26 13.87 24.56 15.92
% People in School age 19 to 24 13.13 10.50 22.80 12.48 20.96
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